CAN CORPORATIONS BE CITIZENS?
Corporate Citizenship as a Metaphor
for Business Participation in Society

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Abstract: This paper investigates whether, in theoretical terms, corporations can be citizens. The argument is based on the observation that the debate on “corporate citizenship” (CC) has only paid limited attention to the actual notion of citizenship. Where it has been discussed, authors have either largely left the concept of CC unquestioned, or applied rather unidimensional and decontextualized notions of citizenship to the corporate sphere. The paper opens with a critical discussion of a major contribution to the CC literature, the work of Logsdon and Wood (Wood and Logsdon 2001; Logsdon and Wood 2002). It continues with a consideration of the nature and role of metaphors for business and of the contestable nature of the political concept of citizenship. It evaluates corporations as citizens through a four-dimensional framework of democratic citizenship offered by Stokes (2002). The analysis suggests that corporations do not easily fit the “liberal minimalist” model of citizenship. It finds, however, some possibilities for fit with the three more participatory models. The paper concludes by cautioning against basing corporate citizenship on legal and administrative status or identity, and mapping out specific criteria by which we might determine whether corporations could be considered as citizens by virtue of their participation in processes of governance.

Introduction

The term “corporate citizenship” (CC) has been used increasingly by corporations, consultants and scholars to echo, underscore, extend, or re-orient certain aspects of corporate social responsibility.1 However, the introduction of this terminology raises important questions about the role of corporations, particularly at a time when there are growing demands for a critical review of the institutions of business and society.

Jeanne Logsdon and Donna Wood (Wood and Logsdon 2001; Logsdon and Wood 2002) have contributed to our thinking about corporations in terms of the political concept of citizenship and have offered different models of citizenship for this purpose. Our paper argues that their approach is incomplete by failing both to take advantage of the range of theoretical possibilities offered by the citizenship concept and to adequately deploy this to address many of the most pressing issues in contemporary
business-society relations including political lobbying, involvement in the legislative process, public policy administration and accountability. Logsdon and Wood, for example, claim that “this linguistic shift [from corporate social responsibility to CC] contains a profound change in normative understandings of how business organizations should act with respect to stakeholders” (2002: 156). However, their key definition of the corporate citizen “as a responsible player in its local environments . . . [with an] [e]mphasis on voluntarism and charity, as well as on the organization’s rights and duties in and for the community” (2002: 156) offers a new name but only limited new insights into business-society relations.

Our paper offers an alternative conceptualization of CC better grounded in contemporary political theory. This conceptualization enables an understanding and evaluation of a wide range of corporate roles and responsibilities. It also provides a basis for delineating the conditions under which citizenship roles and responsibilities should and should not be undertaken by corporations.

This paper opens with a six-point critique of Logsdon and Wood’s conceptual framework and its deployment (‘Theorizing Corporate Citizenship’). Thereafter it considers the general significance of metaphors such as citizenship in the analysis of corporations (‘Corporate Citizenship as a Metaphor in Business Analysis’). Following that, we offer a new theoretical approach to corporate citizenship in which we deploy Stokes’s (2002) framework of democratic citizenship to corporations (‘A New Theoretical Approach to Corporate Citizenship’). In the light of this and structured around the key points in our critique of Logsdon and Wood we offer a new agenda for evaluating claims of corporate citizenship (‘A New Evaluative Agenda for Corporate Citizenship’). This is followed by ‘Discussion and Conclusion.’

Theorizing Corporate Citizenship

Logsdon and Wood’s work (Wood and Logsdon 2001; Logsdon and Wood 2002) marks a major turning point in the corporate citizenship literature. They introduce and develop a theoretical treatment of CC that draws substantially on the political concept of citizenship. This is important, for it offers innovative conceptual potential for understanding business-society relations, and in particular for identifying specific roles and responsibilities for corporate, governmental, and other actors in society. Significantly, the growth of corporate citizenship as a label and as an area of business and management inquiry has coincided with uncertainties about the civil location and attachment of corporations, specifically concerning the social responsibilities of business and the relative powers of corporations. Moreover, citizenship has been a major area of political inquiry in the last twenty years both in re-valourising the norms of citizenship and in addressing perceptions of citizenship deficits, such as the dwindling engagement in electoral politics and the perceptions that the special needs of certain groups have been marginalized in the attribution of rights (Stokes 2002: 23).

However, we contend that although the approach adopted by Logsdon and Wood has some merits, it severely limits this important new potential and, as a result, provides us with a conceptual lens that obscures almost as much as it illuminates. We offer six
main reasons why Logsdon and Wood’s approach is insufficient for the purpose of answering the most fundamental question: can corporations be citizens, and if so, on what grounds, and under what conditions?

The first issue here is that Logsdon and Wood fail to adequately examine the underlying metaphorical nature of the application of citizenship to corporations. As a result, they are unable to delineate with any certainty whether corporations can actually ‘be’ citizens, or whether they are more simply just ‘like’ citizens in the societal roles they play. This distinction is important, for if one argues that corporations are mainly ‘like’ citizens, it may be quite reasonable to accept the nomenclature of “corporate citizenship,” but we might still maintain certain reservations about affording corporations specific rights and responsibilities appropriate for constituents that actually ‘have’ the legal and administrative status of citizens.

The second problem is that Logsdon and Wood rely on fairly simplistic and dated notions of citizenship that do not allow them to explore the normative and conceptual potential of the term. Their view of citizenship is basically dichotomous, differentiating a liberal and a communitarian view. However, much contemporary political theory has moved away from considering citizenship in such terms; rather, it suggests a continuum comprising various aspects of liberal and communitarian citizenship, in which the liberal element is present throughout, though in different intensities. As Abbey argues, there is an ambition in much contemporary political theory “to both go beyond and conserve the liberal tradition” (2002: 151). This is because political theorists recognize both the richness and complexity of the liberal heritage as well as the critical insights that communitarianism has brought to liberalism. Hence, political theorists have increasingly taken a more nuanced view that recognizes the debate within and among conceptions of citizenship (see Isin and Turner 2002). This is important, not simply because such developments are newer or richer in themselves (although they are) but, as we shall see, because this nuanced view offers a much more powerful way of examining the question of whether corporations can be (or be like) citizens. The crucial issue here for us is the range of forms and norms of participation that can inform notions of citizenship, rather than simply its legal and administrative definitions. This makes it possible to flesh out a greater range of potential citizenship roles and values for corporations.

Significantly, the communitarian model is an important element in the general trajectory of citizenship thinking, particularly in terms of understanding certain aspects of participation, which Logsdon and Wood recognize. Thus, there is still a potential contribution to be made in applying their fairly simplistic concept of communitarian citizenship to corporations. Moreover, Logsdon and Wood raise some of the possibilities inherent in this model. However, when they come to applying it specifically to corporations, the linkages are not elucidated in anything like sufficient detail for them to draw any new insights into the social role of the corporation.

Hence, the third problem, as we indicated at the outset, is that for all their claims of staking out new conceptual ground, Logsdon and Wood’s approach simply doesn’t add anything to our existing understanding of business-society relations. Indeed, at the crucial point where they apply communitarian thinking and admit corporations
into the category of citizens, they even acknowledge, “this view is compatible with early definitions of corporate social responsibility” (2002: 162). If this is so, and CC is equivalent to early philanthropic views of CSR, why do we even need to think seriously about the concept of citizenship? In contrast, our view is that citizenship thinking can most certainly be utilized to develop important new theoretical insights into corporate participation in society; it is just that Logsdon and Wood’s approach does not enable them to do so.

So what exactly does Logsdon and Wood’s approach fail to deliver, and what important new insights do we propose can be distilled from an alternative way of examining corporations and citizenship? Our fourth, fifth, and sixth considerations are relevant here. The fourth consideration is that by conflating CC with a limited form of discretionary CSR, Logsdon and Wood’s approach does not offer any new normative basis for the social role of corporations. In their analysis, CC is seen as having a relatively narrow range of obligations (e.g., to pay taxes, obey laws) and as otherwise being essentially voluntaristic (Wood and Logsdon 2001: 86, 95). We believe that given the on-going questions over corporate power and accountability, a new, and far stronger, normative basis is necessary to legitimately locate corporations in the purview of citizenship.

Fifth, this limited view means that Logsdon and Wood’s approach also substantially limits the scope of corporate activities that can be critically examined through the lens of citizenship. Whilst they can accommodate actions such as charitable donations and community development, Logsdon and Wood’s model is not able to examine actions such as corporate political donations, lobbying and involvement in rule-making, even though these would seem to be clearly relevant to questions of citizenship and appropriate corporate participation in society.

Finally, and also in keeping with a more developed normative basis, the application of notions of citizenship to corporations also requires a clearer elucidation of specific conditions under which the status of citizenship can be reasonably extended to corporate bodies. It is one thing to say, as Logsdon and Wood do, that “a company can be viewed as a corporate citizen” (2002: 161, emphasis added), but surely we also need to know the particular circumstances under which this conditional attribution is, or is not, acceptable. To do this, we need clear evaluative criteria of corporate roles and behavior, and of social, economic, and political context.

The paper now moves to consider the place of metaphors in general, and that of CC in particular, in the analysis of business.

**Corporate Citizenship as a Metaphor in Business Analysis**

The introduction of “citizenship” terminology from politics, and its application to corporate actors, represents a move to the metaphorical. Alluding to corporations in terms of citizenship does not literally mean that corporations are citizens or have citizenship, but that their substance or their actions can be understood as being in some meaningful way similar to that of citizens or citizenship. As such, the term CC
is metaphorical, and is one of many metaphors used in the analysis of organizational life and in the projection of business images and brands.

As Morgan (1980) argues, the metaphors of the machine (e.g., Weber, Taylor) and the organism (e.g., Spencer, Parsons) have been at the heart of organizational analysis. However, since the 1960s other metaphors have been used in order to understand organizations in new, and specifically non-functionalist, ways. Importantly, Morgan notes that:

The most powerful use of metaphor arises in instances in which the differences between the two phenomena are seen to be significant but not total. . . . The logic of metaphor . . . suggests that no one metaphor can capture the total nature of organizational life. . . . Different metaphors can constitute and capture the nature of organizational life in different ways, each generating powerful, distinctive, but essentially partial insights. . . . New metaphors may be used to create new ways of viewing organizations which overcome the weaknesses and blind spots of traditional metaphors, offering supplementary or even contradictory approaches to organizational analysis. (1980: 611–12)

This signals that the facet of business behavior in question should not be expected to be synonymous with the metaphor being applied. However, in an era in which corporate branding is both a central strategy for many businesses and a source of suspicion among critics of business (see Klein 2001) it behooves analysts to have regard to the conceptual and analytical possibilities and limitations of metaphors in business.

One of the new sorts of metaphor for business organizations that Morgan cites is the political system, which he sees as highlighting the social dimensions of business. This has been used to draw attention to conflicts of interest and the role of power in organizations (e.g., Crozier 1964). In addition to the metaphor of politics itself, other political concepts have been deployed as metaphors in economic and organizational analysis including democracy (as in stakeholder democracy) and sovereignty (as in consumer sovereignty). Again, whilst these are metaphorical in essence, their selection is generally intended to convey some substantive meaning or value to the organization or activity in question. In the case of CC, this meaning is ostensibly one of community membership and participation.

What is important to recognize here is that the metaphorical use of concepts from politics does not necessarily mean that the concepts are ‘givens.’ In their political context, they are frequently the subject of considerable contestation concerning their definition, scope, and operation, and this contestation can transfer to the organizational context. Indeed, the meaning of citizenship within political debates has been transformed in the space of the twentieth century alone. This has been due to, for example, women’s enfranchisement, growth in multiculturalism, and changes in political boundaries and institutions. Thus, as Parry notes, “[A] totally uncontested and uncontestable concept of citizenship appears to be particularly problematic” (1991: 168).

But what is it about the concept of citizenship that lends it to such dynamics? Gallie (1956) distinguished a class of “essentially contested concepts” whose meaning is always part of debate about their application. Connolly (1983) gives three reasons
why concepts are essentially contested: because they are “appraisive” (or that they are considered as valued); “internally complex”; and their rules of application are relatively “open.” We argue that, by parity of reasoning, the concept of CC is also essentially contestable.

The concept of citizenship is appraisive in that no one covets a reputation for being uncitizenly or a poor corporate citizen. Thus, CC would not be a value-free description. Secondly, CC is internally complex in a number of respects. It is often difficult to extricate from such other corporate activities as reputation building; marketing; knowledge acquisition; and human relations, for example. Hence there are difficulties in accounting for CC’s discrete social contribution or its financial value and in settling on an understanding of its relationship to for-profit activity. Thirdly, CC is open as its different advocates attach particular importance to its different facets. CC is not just a matter for individual firms to pronounce upon. Governments, business associations, business consultants, NGOs, shareholders, employees and consumers have all shown a propensity to attempt to define CC as they seek to endorse, encourage or criticize it. There is no single authority on its definition, a feature underscored by its relationship to stakeholding.

There will always be debate about CC’s meaning, merits, and appropriateness. There is an internal dynamic to this debate as new models of CC are developed against which practices are judged. As Marshall said of the political concept of citizenship:

Societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be measured. (1950: 29)

The nature of these debates reflects social and business contexts within firms, among firms, within countries and among countries. Recognizing that, like its related political concepts, the metaphor of CC is essentially contested does not, of course, obviate the need for closer investigation into its theoretical appropriateness, normative implications, and the conditions under which it can reasonably be deployed. Moreover, it also suggests that we need a new way of theorizing CC that can acknowledge and conceptualize the distinction between corporations having the legal identity ‘of’ citizens, and of them participating in society ‘like’ citizens do. In sum, a new approach to theorizing corporate citizenship is called for.

A New Theoretical Approach to Corporate Citizenship

In the previous section we examined the disputed status of the concept of citizenship, and the difficulties this poses for identifying and deploying an uncontested conceptualization for the purposes of theorizing CC. However, the important qualifications, as we identified earlier in our critique of Logsdon and Wood’s approach, are that the conceptualization: (i) allows us to distinguish between citizenship identity (i.e., corporations ‘are’ citizens) and citizenship activities (i.e., corporations are ‘like’ citizens); (ii) takes advantage of the full conceptual potential of the citizenship concept; (iii) offers new insights on business-society relations; (iv) suggests a new normative basis for business-society relations; (v) encapsulates a full range of corporate social
activities; and (vi) suggests clear conditions under which citizenship can be attributed to corporations.

In reviewing the impressive body of literature on citizenship in political science, one of the more promising avenues for development appears to be Stokes's (2002) taxonomy of citizenship and democracy. Stokes's (2002) framework is propitious for a number of reasons. First, it takes a broad view of citizenship, recognising that it is not only about status but also about "accountability, legitimacy and participation" (2002: 44). This admits a much wider range of citizenship roles than envisaged in the CC literature in general and by Logsdon and Wood (2001; 2002) in particular. Secondly, Stokes locates his analysis of citizenship in the context of democracy, which is appropriate to much contemporary analysis of corporations. Moreover Stokes regards democracy not only as an ideal, but also as a problem associated with disillusionment, declining participation and claims of exclusion of certain groups. Hence Stokes not only considers the positive norms associated with different views of citizenship but also their civic deficits. Although the specific deficits for CC may differ, it is appropriate to regard the linkage of democratic citizenship and corporations as at least potentially problematic in theory and practice. Thirdly, Stokes not only alludes to a "developmental" perspective on citizenship but his whole approach is itself developmental (as opposed to dichotomous). Hence, he notes, "the issues of critique and transformation are significant elements of citizenship theory and practice" (2002: 26). He is accordingly concerned with the unfolding of normative possibilities that the concept of citizenship offers. This is most radically articulated in his analysis of "deliberative" citizenship, which intrinsically exposes participants to new norms through discourse and critical self-reflection.

In the following, we draw from, and build upon, Stokes's (2002) four main models of democratic citizenship—"liberal minimalist," "civic republicanism," "developmental," and "deliberative"—to elucidate different modes of societal participation, and to provide a more developed theorization of CC. As Stokes himself observes, his is still a process of "historical and conceptual simplification" but it not only provides a far richer conceptualization than that offered by Logsdon and Wood, but also "serves to isolate the key characteristics and normative principles . . . and enables their comparison" (2002: 27). Therefore, once we have briefly outlined the approach, we shall detail its normative and evaluative dimensions, and ultimately provide an overview of its theoretical contributions to CC.

**Liberal Minimalism**

Liberal minimalist theories see citizens as in need of protection from arbitrary rule and oppression by government (Stokes 2002: 27–31). These are either rights- or utilitarian-based. Rights-based conceptions of citizenship owe most to John Locke (1690) who assumed that citizens have natural rights to "life, liberty, and property," that these are the duty of government to secure and the basis for citizen protection from government. When government fails to uphold these, the citizens have the right to withdraw their consent. The utilitarian view is premised on similar expectations of government but in the absence of rights as normative guides. In his application to
politics of Adam Smith's assumption of the relationship between the free expression of preferences in markets and public goods (the "invisible hand"), Bentham argued that the only conception of public good is as an aggregation of individual goods.

Schumpeter (1976) developed a minimalist (and utilitarian) theory of citizenship for the democratic age (i.e., in which there is political as well as legal equality). He prized systems of representation in which citizens participate merely by selecting among elites who contend for office. The elites perform the basic functions of governing. He assumed that the very desire of the elites to secure and retain office would make them responsive to citizens' preferences as expressed by their choice of representatives at periodic elections (or, by extension, through opinion polls in between elections). Although Marshall's (1950) version for the age of welfare accorded a wider set of rights to citizens, his model was still premised on the primacy of individual rights and the political division of labor between citizens and government which are both central to the liberal minimalist model.

There is, therefore, little reminiscent of the corporation in this minimalist conceptualization of citizenship. Incorporation, by definition, creates legal corporate identities with attendant rights and responsibilities, and corporations are generally assumed to have national identity for jurisdictional purposes. Business contributes to various aspects of democratic political processes, perhaps most conspicuously in American campaign funding. Notwithstanding these points, corporations nowhere are classified in terms of human citizenship. The justification for the status of an individual as a citizen on legal and administrative grounds, whether based on rights or utilitarian perspectives, offers no metaphor for corporations. Given that Logsdon and Wood primarily subscribe to a status-based deployment of citizenship, they reach a similar conclusion. However, in following Stokes's second, third and fourth views of citizenship, we can move beyond this limited conception of citizenship based on legal status, and thereby unpack the forms and normative dimensions of participation that are eclipsed in Logsdon and Wood's catch-all "communitarian" model.

Civic Republicanism

Civic republicanism (Stokes 2002: 31–34) shares the assumptions of equal legal rights and political equality with liberal minimalism but it also prizes the public or civic good, rather than assuming that the public good is simply an aggregation of individual goods. Civic republicanism is often underpinned by a set of communitarian ties (e.g., McIntyre 1984; Taylor 1992; Walzer 1983) or "moral bonds" (Oldfield 1990: 148) that provide a motivational basis for civic virtue. Accordingly, it prizes obligations such as obeying the law, paying taxes, performing jury and even military service. Valuing the civic good and meeting one's obligations is described as "civic virtue." In contrast to the political division of labor noted above, in this model citizenship is a political activity which both forms and expresses the will of the people and which expresses one commitment to the community (Stokes 2002: 32).

Although corporations cannot share in the obligations of jury service, obedience to the law and paying taxes are clearly criteria of citizenship that they can fulfill. While tax payments would normally be a question of compliance—and thus a given—the
framework of civic republicanism provides a more compelling normative lens on the ascription of citizenship to corporations. As one example among many, recent research on the oil companies Chevron and Texaco identified that they managed to avoid the payment of more than $8.6 billion US income tax between 1964 and 2002 by setting up a complex systems of transfer pricing with their Indonesian subsidiaries (Gramlich and Wheeler, 2003). Though perfectly legal, a perspective of civic republicanism would expose such practices as largely incompatible with corporate citizenship since tax payment would be one of the criteria against which such claims could be measured. Moreover, in broader terms, there is evidence that corporations are capable not only of recognizing public goods but also that business success is critically dependent on this and that corporations can contribute to their maintenance and revival. Moon (1995; 2002) argues that this recognition informs a shift from concerns with internal social pre-requisites of business captured in the managerialism of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1967) to a concern with the external social pre-requisites of business.

This recognition of mutual dependency is precisely the sort of sentiment that underpins Stokes’s civic republicanism, which not only presumes the recognition of public goods but also expects the citizen to pursue these through civic participation. This raises the thorny question of whether and, if so, how any form of participation beyond the minimalist version of periodic voting can be achieved in modern mass societies, be it by individuals or corporations. A great deal of political science has been devoted to unpacking the concept of participation and, in particular, to thinking about its possibilities in modern, mass societies in which many liberals have thought direct participation either impossible or, in the case of Schumpeter, undesirable.

In the business ethics literature, however, there seems to be some optimism for corporations participating in governing, not only on a descriptive level, but also on a normative level. In particular the work of Fort (1996; 1997; Fort and Noone 1999) highlights the role of business as a “mediating institution” in society which, next to, for instance, the family or the church, serves as the institutionalized social link between individual citizens on the one side and society and the public good on the other. As a mediating institution, business provides an environment where many, previously otherwise allocated, needs are met. Consequently, Fort (1997: 156) argues that one of the key responsibilities of business is to provide a non-discriminatory internal working environment. In a citizenship context, Fort’s argument then would spell out the role of the firm as one of the key arenas where civic participation takes place. As the history of affirmative action policies or the example of the Sullivan Principles (Sethi and Williams 2001) shows, by providing space as mediating institutions, corporations can directly participate in societal governance, not only initially within their own boundaries, but indirectly reaching out to wider society in general.

In our further discussion of the civic republican model of citizenship we distinguish two levels of participation for individuals and corporations: in the form of pressure group activity; and in sharing in governing.
Participation through Pressure Group Activity

It has been argued, most famously by Dahl (1956), that political participation is possible in the context of modern democracy. He extended the liberal minimalist model of citizenship by arguing that through membership of interest groups—or in Fort’s terminology “mediating institutions”—citizens can participate in policy debate and decision-making in a far richer way than through periodic voting in elections for representatives or even in periodic referendums on policy alternatives. Dahl assumes that since citizens form and join interest groups that reflect their interests and values, the groups become engaged in policy debates in order to represent their members and, thereby, become effectively surrogate citizens. Whilst Dahl still assumed the political division of labor, he argued that policy-making was enriched as it reflected much wider forms of political participation than that of the elected representatives and permanent bureaucracies alone. Interest groups enable a wide range of perspectives to be brought to bear on policy debates and allow continual political engagement between elections. Participation through pressure groups is therefore seen as a good in its own right rather than simply as a means of “keeping the bastards honest,” to use an Australian expression of the minimalist view. It is a means of forming as well as expressing political opinion.

This raises the question as to whether corporations, severally or collectively (through business associations) can, by extension, constitute part of the interest group world that Dahl presents as acting as a surrogate citizenry. If they were compared with, say environmental or other campaigning groups (usually referred to as “promotional groups” in the pressure group literature [Smith 1990]) the answer to this question might be in the negative. This is because members of promotional groups are composed mainly of those who have no functional dependency on the groups concerned, but join because of their shared values. In contrast, corporations individually represent the functional interests of variously their employees, managers, owners, customers, and suppliers. If, however, corporations were compared with the second main form of pressure group, “sectoral groups” (Smith 1990) such as trade unions or professional associations, then the answer might be in the affirmative. Sectoral groups clearly exist only because their members have a collective functional interests yet might nevertheless be considered as surrogate citizens in Dahl’s original terms. Certainly some large corporations have embraced this view, sometimes even in their interpretation of CC. So, for instance, for a company like ExxonMobil it is part of their commitment to CC “to engage in public policy debates and discussions with governments around the world” as well as to provide “support to political candidates” (ExxonMobil 2003: 31). For other firms, such practices may be more an element of non-market strategy (Baron 2000). The key point is that, unlike the Logsdon and Wood approach, we can consider and evaluate such practices against the criteria for citizenship.

There is certainly an extensive literature on corporations, individually (e.g., Grant 1984; Useem 1984) and collectively (e.g., Coleman 1988) participating in politics in which, like other interests, they combine expression of private interests with engagement in collective processes of decision-making (Vogel 1996; Getz 1997; Lord 2000). There is also evidence that corporations individually and collectively have acted as
pressure groups when governments have been reviewing the role of regulation in matters pertaining to the social and environmental responsibilities of business. A recent example is the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), which was built by about 40 US companies and industry associations of the fossil fuel industry in order to fend off potential tighter legislation based on global treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol (Levy and Egan 2003). While a framework of CC based on civic republicanism would assign these roles to corporations, it would however also accommodate these roles in a context that establishes certain conditions and duties to such a citizen-like role of corporations. Certainly, the attitude towards tax payment of major oil MNCs, as discussed above, sits uneasily with their role as “corporate citizens” in this political framework. Furthermore, such a role for corporations raises some further evaluative issues, which we discuss later in the paper.

Participation in Governing

Whereas Dahl identified political participation through and by pressure groups as constituting a modern equivalence of classical direct participation, more recent debates in democratic theory have led to the identification and valorisation of more direct forms of political participation in governing itself. Ironically perhaps, some of these arguments initially drew on experiences of participation in industry (e.g., Pateman 1970). However, there have also been more thoroughgoing attempts to retrieve for modern times the classical assumption that citizens rule as well as being ruled. Often these attempts have been associated with an increased individual level of participation in local politics and in national politics through the increased use of referendums or participation in public hearings on environmental matters, for example. In these cases, the political division of labor between government and citizens is maintained but the citizens avail themselves of increased opportunities to inform agendas and the definition of issues.

There is also an interest in collectivist opportunities for increased participation that do not assume a political division of labor. Hirst, for example, argues for associationalism, contending that

human welfare and liberty are best served where as many of the affairs of society as possible are managed by voluntary and democratically self-governing associations. (1993: 112)

Once again, we find evidence that corporations are participating in this more direct form of citizenship. We identify two broad ways in which corporations can participate in governing: (i) sharing in new governance in developed political systems; (ii) assuming neo-governmental roles within the corporation’s usual economic activities.

The first form is in the complex relationships that arise in “new governance” in developed political systems. Moon (2002) argues that this is in the context of governments seeking to share responsibilities and to develop new modes of operation, whether as a result of overload or of a view that they do not have a monopoly of solutions for society. This is often in the form of “social” partnerships with non-profit and for-profit organizations (Waddock 1988; Moon and Sochacki 1998). Though some of these are premised on market and contractual relations (Cashore 2002; Earles and
Moon 2000), others (which fit into citizenship models) are based on reciprocity and consensus-building (Moon and Willoughby 1990; Orts, 1995; Renn, Webler and Wiedemann 1995; Ronit 2001). These have brought non-profit organizations such as NGOs, pressure groups, or societal associations into governance roles (e.g., in the delivery of social services for which governments retain legislative and fiscal responsibility). They have also brought corporations into aspects of the delivery of programs in such areas as economic development, environmental improvement, or education, for example.

For Drucker, this sort of activity precisely links corporations to citizenship:

As a political term citizenship means active commitment. It means responsibility. It means making a difference in one’s community, one’s society, and one’s country. (1993, quoted in Andriof and Mcintosh, 2001: 14)

Birch (2001) argues further that there is a link between corporations and citizenship when business sees itself as part of the public culture rather than seeing the public culture as something external to the company.

Secondly, corporations participate in governing by sharing in the administration of individual citizens’ rights, both within companies, and more broadly within the boundaries of companies’ external economic relations. For example, Matten, Crane and Chappie (2003) argue that corporations increasingly administer the citizenship rights of their employees and their families, such as in the case of pay and working conditions, health, and education. This is especially likely to be the case where government regulation is weak, or where the welfare state is fragile or in retreat, and corporations might be expected to assume some of the burdens of ensuring that basic rights are met. Similarly, they argue that consumers, investors, and others might rely on the actions of corporations to ensure that their fundamental rights to property and basic services are protected. In extreme cases, particularly in developing countries, multinational corporations (MNCs) are increasingly expected to participate in governing where there was previously a governance vacuum, thereby undertaking to institute and enforce entirely new rules and norms to safeguard individual rights.

We can therefore see that corporations are able to participate in ways that are also assumed of citizens in civic republicanism. This extends from their propensity to operate like pressure groups in raising and defining issues and pressing claims through to participating in decision-making and to sharing responsibility for governing. We have suggested two ways in which corporations share in governing: first by contributing to societal governance issues outside the firm, often in partnerships with governmental or non-governmental organizations; and second, by administering rights within the normal operations of the firm.

The particular benefits of applying this conceptual framework of citizenship to corporations are that it accommodates a full range of social and political participation, and by predicating participation on obligations towards the common or “civic” good, provides a means to examine the legitimacy of ostensibly citizen-like behavior. While corporations normally are willing to participate in governing when it is in their self-interest—as the example of the GCC shows—a republican perspective
would ground the normative basis of citizenship in participation that is enacted for the common good, even if it is not in their immediate self-interest. Indeed, under this model, a “corporate citizen” would be expected to readily and actively participate in lobbying and governance for the civic good across a reasonable span of its operations and influence. However, there are numerous instances of supposedly “good corporate citizens” desisting from such participation. For example, the current debate on the corporate responsibility for attending to escalating rates of obesity illustrates a common pattern. Corporations such as Coca Cola (which has enthusiastically embraced the notion of CC) have been seen to be extremely reluctant to readily accept a role in participating for the civic good when the political solutions are unlikely to be in their favor. Although many commentators have observed that “the [US] sugar industry has its hands wrapped around the political system” (Revill and Harris 2004), the normative basis of the civic republican framework would demand that such political involvement was harnessed for achieving social good, rather than simply fending off legislation.

**Developmental Democracy**

Thus far we have seen that, whereas the classical view of political participation entails citizens ruling and being ruled, liberal-democracy and mass society have combined to yield a political division of labor, such that Schumpeter assumes the only appropriate form of participation to be periodic voting. This minimalist view has been extended within civic republicanism, which envisages wider opportunities for citizen involvement in informing or even participating in policy-making and in governing. We have seen how corporations can be drawn into such forms of participation.

Conceptions of citizenship within developmental democracy (Stokes, 2002: 34–39) offer the view that to flourish, democratic polities require citizens who are highly participatory and who have very close bonds with one another. This is because advocates of developmental democracy, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, and G. D. H. Cole, see participation as the principal means of personal and intellectual development as well as for societal flourishing (another illustration of the possibility of individual benefit being consistent with social benefit). Indeed Cole sees such increased societal capacity as an alternative to state administration (Hirst 1989). Thus, participation is not merely a manifestation of citizen obligation, or a pre-requisite of good government, but also as a basis for individual human and societal improvement.

Interestingly, Stokes expressly identifies this developmental model of citizenship with corporate citizenship because it entails fulfilling obligations to society rather than just to government (2002: 38). There is much in the use of the term sustainability by corporations which gestures in this direction. In particular, we suggest that “triple bottom line” thinking, with its commitments to social justice, environmental responsibility, and economic development is predicated on an assumption that business can and should provide a major contribution to society through a long-term commitment to social participation (Elkington 1999). This is illustrated in Hewlett-Packard’s conceptualization of itself as an organization which “is helping people overcome barriers to social and economic progress” and is “learning to compete better in the region [South Asia] and around the world” (Dunn and Yamashita 2003: 46) as a result...
of its engagement in the Kuppam region of India. This is not only described as the company’s responsibility to the AIDS infected area but also in terms of the value that the Kuppan community will contribute to Hewlett-Packard.

The developmental perspective on CC contrasts to extant views of CC particularly in the breadth of roles and commitments that a citizenship role would entail for the corporation. It certainly goes well beyond the limited philanthropic view of CSR mapped out by Logsdon and Wood. Furthermore, it allows a critical assessment of the relations between corporations and governments in that the notion of developmental democracy suggests that rather than delegating the responsibility for the governance of contested societal issues to governments, corporations as citizens can be rightly expected to become an active protagonist in those governance processes.

A negative example would be the attitude of the corporations united in the GCC towards the Kyoto Protocol (Levy and Kolk 2002). While the consent of most countries globally to the treaty could well be interpreted as the expression of the majority, members of the GCC still refuse to take this preference seriously. In a developmental perspective this stands in clear contrast to, for instance, ExxonMobil’s claim to act as a “global corporate citizen” (ExxonMobil 2003: 41).

A positive example of corporations living up to a citizen role in a developmental democratic setting could be seen in the voluntary initiative of UK supermarkets to ban GM food from their shelves in the late nineties. This occurred in response to public anxieties about this technology even though the UK government still had not established any regulatory framework for the issue (Kolk 2000: 96–97). We will return to the questions of whether the assumption of human flourishing within the developmental model offers a metaphor for corporations, and the compatibility of this with wider assumptions about societal flourishing.

**Deliberative Democracy**

Stokes’s fourth view of citizenship is in the context of deliberative democracy (2002: 39–44). This not only emphasizes citizen participation in public affairs but also assumes that they participate in a deliberative fashion enabling them to better address issues of complexity, pluralism, and inequality in decision-making. Reference to the reality of pluralism constitutes skepticism about a single moral view uniting the polity, which civic republicanism tends to assume. Cohen (1997: 73) suggests that the outcomes of deliberative democracy are only legitimate “if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned argument among equals.” This is in greatest contrast to the representative model, which is incapable of involving the citizen in the resolution of the complexities of decision-making. Adherents argue that deliberative participation constrains the articulation and pursuit of self-interest as well as contributing to individual flourishing. The citizen would become used to and good at listening to and understanding other perspectives (see Boman 1996; Dryzek 1990; Fishkin 1991). This model emphasizes equality, which raises the issue discussed above of the significance of corporation-specific resources in political processes.

The model of deliberative democratic citizenship specifies a style of engagement which emphasizes a problem-solving approach rather than one based on a show of
hands or a meeting of wills. The emphasis is less on the resolution of competing interests and more upon the identification of solutions through deliberative participation. In the literature on business and society relations, such a concept has been discussed for some time, though under different labels and assumptions. For example, in application of Habermas’s (1983) concept of discourse ethics, Steinmann and Löhr (1994) have proposed corporate dialogues, mediation processes, and other fora, to both involve citizens in corporate decisions as well as making corporations active and accountable members of their respective communities. As befits a deliberative democracy model, discourse ethics prescribes rules for a process of participation in governance. As such, the main criteria for those taking part in participative discourses are impartiality, non-persuasiveness, non-coercion, and expertise (Preuss 1999), thereby underscoring the appreciation for individual freedom and autonomy in the deliberative model.

The idea of discourse participation has been used quite widely especially in environmental disputes, for example by the US EPA in regulatory negotiations (Fiorino 1995). One major challenge for such discourses though is in overcoming conflicts about values. On the positive side, they have the potential to enable collective decisions which are informed by the expertise and values of all those who are affected by a decision. The proximity of deliberative citizenship and discourse ethics from a business perspective lies in the fact that both specifically envisage the direct involvement of citizens in the governance of public affairs.

Ultimately, deliberative democracy also comes close to ideals developed in stakeholder theory, especially in relation to the term “stakeholder democracy” (Freeman 1984). The actual extent to which corporations engage in the various participatory forms of governance in a deliberative way is an empirical question. Interestingly, the model does have a strong resonance with the call for increased stakeholder participation and dialogue. Even though this is advocated for strategic as well as ethical reasons, Freeman’s expectation is that stakeholder relations should be on the basis of voluntary negotiation of corporations with multiple stakeholders on critical issues to secure voluntary agreements and, more broadly, that corporations should serve stakeholder needs (1984: 78–80).

A New Evaluative Agenda

A number of evaluative issues remain for corporations to be recognized as acting in citizenly ways, participating in debates, sharing in decision-making, and sharing the responsibilities of governing. The first evaluative issue concerns the significance of citizenship as a metaphor or as a legal-administrative status. It could be argued that this is inappropriate and citizenship is essentially a legal-administrative question; those without the requisite legal and administrative attributes should not be accorded citizenship status. The problem with this move is that in order to accommodate the notion of increased participation in modern liberal polities, other organizations have been recognized as conforming to citizenship processes and thus as surrogate citizens. This is true of pressure groups, societal associations and new social movements. The question therefore arises as to the basis for excluding corporations but not other col-
lectivities. It is an empirical question as to the closeness of the bonds that develop among corporations and between them and other participants, which the developmental view of democracy would presume. There are, however, other theoretical questions which follow.

One argument for admitting other collective organizations to citizenship processes but excluding corporations could go that the former are essentially composed of aggregates of citizens and that the latter are composed of special resources and interests. If we come back to the example of an MNC such as ExxonMobil and its efforts to participate in the governance of environmental issues, such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, this problem becomes rather visible: an oil MNC has some very specific interests which are quite opposed to those of other societal actors. However, the problem is also that many societal organizations whose engagement in governance is valorized by participatory models of citizenship do not reflect participation either in their own operations or, moreover, represent interests which transcend aggregates of individual citizens (e.g., the environment, religious norms, rights claims). Moreover, corporations also represent aggregates of human interests (e.g., of shareholders, consumers, employees, business customers and suppliers). One could argue then, that corporations actually are participating in governance anyway in the same way as other surrogate citizens. ExxonMobil donates to political actors and parties, builds pressure groups such as the GCC or tries to influence public opinion through massive communication efforts (Livesey 2002). The key strength of framing these activities in a framework of CC as proposed here is that it not only conceptualizes these different functions and furthers our theoretical understanding of the corporate role in society but—even more importantly—provides a normative basis for evaluating corporate responsibility which the assumption of a citizen-like role implies, i.e., that corporations should participate in governance.

This leads to a second evaluative question, that of corporations' accountability to the constituencies or stakeholders who represent those aggregates of human interests. The issue of corporate accountability to a broader constituency than shareholders alone has been a strong theme in recent business ethics research (e.g., Cumming, 2001; Gray et al. 1997). To return to our example, it is common currency that ExxonMobil was the biggest single sponsor of George W. Bush's 2000 campaign, but the fact that the public is still left to guess the strength of their influence on subsequent political or even military decisions in the White House exposes the accountability problem.

However, in order to exclude corporations from the citizenship process, one would have to show that other participants, such as governmental and non-governmental organizations, are necessarily more (or more able to be) accountable to individual citizens whose interests they ultimately might be said to represent. Given that corporate accountability mechanisms and tools are currently underdeveloped, there might be some basis for making this claim. Nonetheless, it is evident that many other interest and pressure groups also face considerable deficits in accountability (Ali 2000; Bendell 2000a; Hilhorst 2002).

It should be noted though that these issues of corporate accountability exist regardless of corporate attempts to assume the metaphor of citizenship for their role
in society. However, the framework of CC as discussed here and the various views of citizenship not only identify and expose these problems but would also provide a basis for assigning modes, forms and institutional arrangements of corporate accountability. If corporations participate in governance in the respective frameworks their accountability should be analogous to those other actors with whom they share in governance. Returning to our earlier example, ExxonMobil as a corporate citizen then, in turn would be obliged to account for the ways in which it lives up to its obligations to the public good. The fact that we know about their donations is due to the fact that these standards of accountability exist for political parties. A CC framework would suggest the application of those standards to corporations as well, with the result of disclosure of a far broader range of activities, such as lobbying or influences on regulatory processes.

A third issue emerging from the above is that of the private interests that corporations bring with them. Clearly, there is business proclivity for engaging directly in the political process in order to press their case on public policy questions (see Reich 1998). But it is unclear that this uniquely applies to corporations. As noted, the major premise of liberal citizenship is self-interest and although this is less a driving motivation in the supra-minimalist models, contributors all point to the individual benefits of participation. Stokes endorses Phillips’s (2000) contention that republicanism is capable of providing an insecure resolution of “that tension between insisting that different groups do have distinct and different interests and nonetheless projecting a vision of politics as something more than looking after yourself.” (Stokes 2002: 34)

This suggests that in political theory, as in debates about business, there is an acceptance that participation entails tolerating some overlap between private and public interest. Again, the example of the oil MNCs in the GCC illustrates the point. The European corporations such as BP and Shell which pulled out of the GCC in 1996 did not do so only because they suddenly changed their views on the issues. One could rather argue that, as the developmental view of democratic citizenship suggests, because they work in a dense network of interpersonal relations in society, they perceived that they could not act against seemingly well-established societal preferences. Admitting them into the role of citizens then ultimately leads to a situation where corporations align their self-interests in a controlled and accountable way with interests of society. The typical result, as seen in the cases of BP and Shell, is processes of self-regulation, which allow corporations to pursue societal demands in a fashion that is still compatible with their own corporate interests and goals.

A fourth criterion for excluding corporations from the category of citizenship entirely could be their relative power premised, for example, on wealth, on the structural dependencies that they create (e.g., for work, income), or on their access to other key decision-makers (e.g., in government). ExxonMobil Canada as one of the self declared “largest corporate donors” to Canadian Air Rescue Services (ExxonMobil 2003: 31) shapes the administration of the public good in a manner which might even exceed the influence of local or regional governmental authorities in Canadian healthcare.
Indeed Dahl himself (1985) recognized problems with his own earlier arguments as he came to the view that businesses possessed such economic power that they could not be equated with surrogate citizens. Rather, in the same way as governments need to be constrained for liberals, Dahl argued that firms needed to be subject to democratic processes. It is not clear that Dahl’s argument is conclusive. As indicated in his earlier work (1956; 1961), different political resources are efficacious in different contexts. In other words, corporate power does not always trump the mobilization of ideas; popular majorities, other coalitions and, moreover, corporations are often aligned against each other in policy debates (Vogel 1983; 1986).

Certainly on a global level, the example of the GCC is quite a good example of corporations finding themselves restricted and controlled by other corporations, if we think particularly of the transatlantic divide in the corporate take on global warming. Therefore the issue of power differentials in civic republicanism may not be as straightforward as first thought. However, as indicated by the deliberative view of citizenship, it may nonetheless be appropriate to consider either the extent to which the powerful, be they corporations or otherwise, have incentives to exercise self-restraint or whether arenas for free and fair deliberation are institutionalized. Again, we would argue that citizenship theory—though not prescribing immediate answers to these anxieties—nevertheless provides a conceptual framework of discussing these issues in a systematic and consistent manner.

Ultimately, these evaluative issues associated with granting corporations the role of citizens as discussed in this section refer to problems around the contemporary role of corporations in society—regardless of whether they are framed as corporate citizens or not. A framework of CC as discussed here however opens up the possibility of assessing this role in a way that systematically conceptualizes the potential benefits as well as the constraints of that role: it also ultimately provides an opportunity to apply duties and obligations analogous to those of individual citizens to corporate actors.

Discussion and Conclusion

This relatively brief foray has provided a range of perspectives about citizenship of people in democracy. This has been used as a basis for considering the appropriateness of citizenship models for corporations. Table 1 provides an overview of the discussion so far.

All political models of citizenship share the assumption that citizens stand in some sovereign relationship to the government and the direction of the activity of governing or “governance.” This raises immediate questions about the appropriateness of the term for corporations. We have seen that there are no strong grounds for applying the minimalist conception of citizenship to corporations, as they do not meet the legal and administrative status test. They are manifestly not bearers of the political rights that are characteristically seen as fundamental to liberal citizenship.

As we move through the different models of citizenship, it is clear that roles and responsibilities, corporations aside, become more blurred. In the minimalist view, it is taken for granted that the political division of labor operates (between elections governments
## Table 1: Four models of citizenship and their potential application to corporate citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of citizenship</th>
<th>Liberal Minimalism</th>
<th>Civic Republicanism</th>
<th>Developmental Democracy</th>
<th>Deliberative Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basis for citizenship</strong></td>
<td>Citizenship as a bundle of rights or utilities, administered by governing elites</td>
<td>Citizenship as participation in a community, involving obligations towards the public (or 'civic') good</td>
<td>Citizenship as a dense network of interpersonal relations in society for individual and social flourishing</td>
<td>Citizenship as free deliberation over public decisions in a community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of participation by citizens</strong></td>
<td>Extremely limited; mostly by electoral choice of governing elites</td>
<td>Obligation to governments and sharing governance with elites</td>
<td>Fulfillment of obligations to society (rather than just to government) and enactment of direct relations to fellow citizens</td>
<td>Direct involvement in collective problem-solving on basis of equality and plural values to address complex problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential as metaphor for 'corporate' citizenship</strong></td>
<td>Offers no space for CC; corporations do not share legal and administrative status of citizens.</td>
<td>Corporate lobbying of government, 'New governance', business as partner of civil society actors</td>
<td>Corporate involvement with all stakeholders beyond the bottom line rationale for social flourishing</td>
<td>Corporations assume deliberative role in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative basis for corporate citizenship</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Corporations should participate in societal governance</td>
<td>Corporations should align self-interest with social flourishing</td>
<td>Corporations should participate in civic deliberation as equals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditions for applying citizenship metaphor to corporations</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Corporations represent aggregates of human interest</td>
<td>Corporations represent aggregates of human interest</td>
<td>Corporations represent aggregates of human interest</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corporations discharge accountability analogous to other surrogate citizens</td>
<td>Corporations discharge accountability analogous to other surrogate citizens</td>
<td>Corporations discharge accountability analogous to other surrogate citizens</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Reciprocal ties between corporations and civil society</td>
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<td>Arenas for free and fair deliberation</td>
<td>Arenas for free and fair deliberation</td>
<td>Arenas for free and fair deliberation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
rule and citizens are ruled). In modern variants of civic republicanism, governments do not disappear but there is still an expectation that representative bodies participate in decision-making, be they defined as organized interests (Dahl 1961) or societal associations (Hirst 1993). The legitimacy of these participants is principally functional. The developmental and deliberative citizenship models both assume that participation combines individual and social benefits, although the deliberative model assumes that the former are suppressed in the activity of engaging with substantive approaches to problem solving rather than continuing to assert particularistic ones. This all suggests that, corporations apart, lines of responsibility and issues of legitimacy are in flux.

These models of citizenship emphasize not only legal and administrative status but also a more metaphorical conception of citizenship based on engagement in participatory processes. We suggested that in their engagement in “new governance” (Moon 2002), particularly through partnerships with governments and societal organizations, and in their role in the administration of rights, corporations are sharing in the doing of government ‘like’ citizens.

We conclude that the proposed framework of CC discussed in this paper addresses the concerns we raised at the outset with Logsdon and Wood’s approach. We concur with them in that the metaphor of citizenship on grounds of legal and administrative status through the minimalist model is not appropriate for corporations. While corporations therefore ‘are’ not citizens (in the sense of status) we contend that corporations could reasonably claim to act ‘as if’ they were metaphorically citizens in that their engagement in society resembles that of citizens. We suggest, though, that there are various forms of participation, ranging from indirect participation as pressure groups, to the deliberative model, which entails direct participation in order to resolve problems rather than to press particular interests.

Our proposed framework therefore better reflects the richness of the citizenship debate. It also offers a more powerful conceptual lens with which to analyze corporate roles and responsibilities. In particular it conceptualizes a broad range of corporate political activities and thus moves clearly beyond a view that sees CC just as a rebranding of a rather narrow version of CSR. We would argue that a particular benefit of our thinking is that it provides the basis for a fresh normative perspective on the corporate role in society. If corporations can ‘be’ citizens (or even if they claim to be ‘like’ citizens) then, we would argue, that there are certain conditions for them to respect, certain criteria to be fulfilled and certain obligations to be met. Consequently, this approach goes beyond a mere voluntaristic view of CC. In fact, we argue that this conception of CC focuses on the forms and norms of corporate participation in governing society that includes a plethora of activities beyond the rather narrow and local scope of activities in the Logsdon and Wood model. In referring to well-defined concepts of citizenship, finally, we regard our framework as far better equipped to elucidate the conditions under which corporations can reasonably be admitted into the sphere of citizenship.
Notes

1 We are grateful for helpful comments provided by participants at the Global Business Citizenship for Human Rights and a Sustainable Environment panel of the International Association for Business and Society conference, Rotterdam 2003 and at a seminar of the Corporate Citizenship Research Unit, Deakin University, 2003; for discussions with Ruth Abbey, Simon Palmquist and Geoff Stokes; and for suggestions by anonymous reviewers.

2 Logsdon and Wood’s argument would be that the real contribution comes from thinking about “global citizenship.” However, if corporate citizenship is equivalent to CSR, then any move to the global level of analysis is moot; logically, we could just as easily substitute “global” CSR for “global” CC (or “business citizenship” in Logsdon and Wood’s terminology). The lack of new conceptual understanding is merely moved onto a different level.

3 Gallie, who devised the term, provides seven criteria for essentially contested concepts but for present purposes we will content ourselves with Connolly’s three criteria.

4 E.g., the topic of the 2003 Academy of Management Conference, “Democracy in the Knowledge Economy.”


6 N.B. The successful operation of the system of jury and civil defence systems does require that corporations cooperate by enabling employees to participate.

7 Contrary to Logsdon and Wood, modern communitarian theory is not necessarily characterised by its closed, local spatial character. For example, Charles Taylor’s association with communitarianism principally results from his anxiety about such liberal tenets as atomistic ontology, the conception of society as a contract and its emphasis on negative freedom (see Abbey 2002: 152).

8 This is an example of the conditions under which the concept of citizenship might be applicable to corporations, regardless of whether Chevron Texaco itself actually claims to be a ‘corporate citizen.’

9 The literature here is voluminous. The work of Dahl (e.g., 1961; 1985; 1989) provides a good primer.

10 Whereas Stokes places this in the liberal minimalist model we place it under civic republicanism due to its stress on participation and engagement.

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